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Voter fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our government. Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised. 1 The current debate over the constitutionality of laws mandating photo identification for voters presents a series of largely unanswered, and in some respects, unanswerable, empirical questions. For the most part, the parties to the litigation culminating in the case currently before the Court, Crawford v.
Marion County Elections Board,
2 have speculated about the number of illegal votes cast and the number of legal voters who would be prevented from voting were voting conditioned on the production of a driver's license or some other form of state-issued voter identification. When critics point to the lack of prosecutions or reported incidences of voter impersonation fraud, defenders of such laws reply, in part, that successful fraud goes undetected. When defenders of voter ID argue that such laws lead to very few people being turned away from the polls or having their votes uncounted, critics respond that even a violation of the voting rights of a few is constitutionally impermissible, and that precious little data exist to assess both the impact of such laws on the currently voting population or the deterrent effect it might have on future voters. With the scarcity of empirical findings to settle some of the factual issues central to this debate, 3 there is great risk that the Court will resign itself, as it hinted it might in Purcell v. Gonzalez, quoted above, to its intuition that "fear" of election fraud "drives honest citizens out of the democratic process." This intuition, however, presents a testable empirical proposition, which this Article attempts to evaluate based on new survey data that assess the popular 1 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2006) (per curiam) (emphasis added). 2 484 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007 ), cert. granted, 2007 WL 1999963 (Sept. 25, 2007 (upholding Indiana photo identification law). 3 The studies submitted as part of the litigation are all unpublished. They include: We begin this Article in Part I by situating the argument as to fears of fraud into the debate over voter identification requirements and election law more generally. The argument follows a path familiar to campaign finance law, in which the Court elided difficult questions about the empirics of campaign contributions and corruption by relying on the appearance of corruption as a state interest sufficient to justify restrictions on campaign contributions and expenditures. 4 Part II describes the unique national survey we conducted to assess how widespread popular fear of two different types of election fraud is and the relationship between such fear and the likelihood of voters turning out to vote. In Part III, we present findings suggesting that such fears of fraud, while held by a sizable share of the population, do not have any relationship to a respondent's likelihood of intending to vote or turning out to vote. Part IV then assesses whether voter identification laws might make a difference in quelling such fears of fraud. We find that voters who have been forced to show identification are also no less likely to perceive fraud then those not similarly subject to an ID requirement. Part V presents our conclusions, which can be simply summarized here. In this Article, we do not endeavor to assess the extent of actual fraud or the likelihood of vote denial under a photo identification regime, 5 but we consider those to be the central empirical questions that should guide the decision over the constitutionality of voter ID laws. The Court should not seek refuge in this field, as it has others, in putative conventional wisdom as to the alleged harms caused by widespread perceptions of a defect in American democracy or the likelihood of voter ID laws to address them. That conventional wisdom is wrong, we argue, and should not substitute for the admittedly challenging predictive judgments as to the greater constitutional threat posed by actual fraud or by attempts to prevent it. the Court has said "of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large financial contributions."
12 In cases challenging the constitutionality of such laws, the defenders of campaign finance reforms point to news reports, testimony and even public opinion polls suggesting that people view campaign contributors as having undue influence over government policy.
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As is the risk with the voter ID inquiry, this backup state interest founded on appearances and perceptions allows defendants (and judges) to escape from the more difficult task of proving the existence of actual corruption. In other words, it is much easier to prove that people believe campaign contributions often buy political favors than it is to demonstrate that such a dynamic, in fact, exists. Because politicians can almost always say "they would have voted that way anyway" and contributors can almost always say "we direct money to candidates who already share our beliefs" it will be very difficult to prove that a given contribution's recipient would have behaved differently in its absence. Indeed, such perceptions and appearances do not even really depend on the existence of actual corruption, because awareness of the "opportunities for abuse" is sufficient to establish the state's interest. Nor does an analysis based on such perceptions necessarily imply that a particular remedy will be successful in removing them.
The argument is similar when it comes to vote fraud. Rather than undertake the more difficult task of proving its existence, 14 it is much easier to look at a system's potential for abuse and to point to public opinion that suggests such abuse occurs with great frequency. In both contexts, one cannot quibble with the democratic value of such feelings of legitimacy in the abstract. That is, few would prefer a state of affairs in which people see 9 Id. 10 424 U.S. 1 (1976 
III.
Beliefs in the Frequency of Vote Theft, Vote Fraud and Voter Impersonation
The survey questions concerning the frequency of election fraud attempted to gauge respondents' opinions on three distinct phenomena. The first, which involves the type of fraud at issue in the Purcell litigation, 21 concerns the illegal casting of votes by noncitizens or the casting of more than http://www.pollster.com/Polimetrix%20CCES%20Press%20Release%20110606.pdf. 21 The law at issue in Purcell required voters to present proof of citizenship when they register to vote and to present identification when they vote on election day. Purcell, 549 U.S. at __. 8 one ballot by a voter. We term this voter fraud. The second, which is most relevant to the Crawford litigation, concerns the attempt of one voter to vote using the name of another. We term this voter impersonation. The final phenomenon, which concerns stealing or tampering with votes once cast, is what we call vote theft. We recognize that these questions together do not exhaust all possible types of election fraud. We also acknowledge that simple survey questions cannot perfectly capture the intricacies of the illegality alleged to be prevented by voter identification requirements. Nevertheless, the data begin to give a sense of how widespread the public considers certain election irregularities to be. The distribution of responses is also consistent with that found in other surveys on election fraud. 22 The precise wording of the survey items appears below: It is also illegal to vote more than once in an election or to vote if not a U. S. citizen. How frequently do you think this occurs?
Version A (asked of half the sample) 22 See Rasmussen Reports, National Survey of 800 Likely Voters, January 2-3, 2008, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/general_curr ent_events/general_current_events_toplines/toplines_voter_id_january_2_3_2008. 23 By asking respondents how frequently they thought "such vote fraud" occurs, the 2007 phrasing of the question may have primed respondents to express their concerns about voter fraud more generally, rather than the type of fraud asked about in the question. The 2008 question replaces "such vote fraud" with "this" so respondents are not at risk of answering a question about voter fraud more generally. As discussed later, the share agreeing to the top category dropped and to the bottom category increased. We also split the sample to see whether the offered categories affected the distribution of responses. For example, under the 2007 version a respondent might not have seen a difference between the second category ("occasionally") and the third ("infrequently"). The difference in the categories did not lead to any substantial effect on responses to the first and last categories but might have led to some shuffling among the intermediate categories. The results from the surveys appear in Table 1 . In the 2007 survey, the findings with respect to vote fraud and vote theft are quite similar. About a quarter of respondents believe vote fraud (26%) and vote theft (23%) are very common. Another 36% and 37%, respectively, believe fraud and theft occur occasionally. About a fifth say vote fraud (20%) and vote theft (21%) occur infrequently, and only 8% say fraud and theft almost never occur. These numbers are consistent with a recent Rasmussen poll which found that 23% of 10 likely voters agreed that "[i]n most elections, large numbers of people [are] allowed to vote who are not eligible to vote." 24 The 2008 survey, probably because of the change in question wording, revealed a decline in the top category to 12 and 14 percent and an increase in the bottom category to 13 and 12 percent. Nevertheless, a substantial share of the population (either 45 or 51 percent) choose one of the top two categories, suggesting a large number of people believe such fraud occurs with some regularity. A smaller share of the population believes voter impersonation is common. Only 9 percent think voter impersonation occurs very often, while 32 percent think it happens somewhat often. Still, 41 percent chose one of the two top categories. 
______________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________
One potentially important lesson from the comparison of the various question wordings concerns the use of the words "voting fraud" in describing the behavior. Activities explicitly labeled "vote fraud" evoked expressions of beliefs in higher frequencies of the activity. The activities themselves, 11 including non-citizen voting or voting multiple times, were thought to occur somewhat less often when simply described. This suggests to us that descriptions employing the catch-phrase "vote fraud" prompt some people to overstate their beliefs in certain sorts of behaviors.
Political debate over identification requirements and voter fraud has exposed a partisan difference. Democrats tend to express greater worries about vote theft and Republicans express greater concerns about voter fraud. The 2007 and 2008 survey data bear out the partisan orientation of beliefs about vote fraud. Democrats are only slightly more likely than Republicans to state that Vote Theft is very common. However, the partisan gap with respect to fraud is much more pronounced, as portrayed in Appendix A. More than twice as many Republicans than Democrats consider Vote Fraud to be very common. Looking at the 2008 survey, the partisan division on voter impersonation follows the same partisan division as voter fraud. Three out of ten Democrats said that they thought Voter Impersonation occurs Often or Very Often, while fully half of all Republicans (54%) said so. One in five Democrats (21%) thought Impersonation occurs "Very Rarely," but just one in twenty Republicans (5%) said that it happens very rarely. In the 2008 sample, 57% of Republicans said Fraud occurs Often or Very Often, compared with 39% of Democrats. Party remains a significant predictor of beliefs about both Fraud and Impersonation in a multivariate analysis that controls for ideology, education, age, race, income, and region. (See Table 4 below.)
Other demographic and political variables also help explain people's beliefs about the frequency of fraud, theft, and impersonation. Ideology (an individual's self-placement on a liberal to conservative continuum) does an even better job than partisanship in explaining attitudes as to the prevalence of fraud. Whereas 46 percent of those who describe themselves as very conservative believe fraud is very common, only 16 percent of those who describe themselves as very liberal hold a similar view. A similar pattern holds for voter impersonation -five percent of liberals said voter impersonation occurs very often, compared with fourteen percent of conservatives. Ideology cut the opposite way on vote theft, with liberal respondents thinking it more likely to occur than conservative respondents.
The racial gap in opinion is smaller than the ideological divide: 16 percent of Blacks, 21 percent of Hispanics, and 27 percent of Whites think fraud is very common.
25 These racial differences cannot be entirely explained by socioeconomic status, given that lower educated and poorer respondents are somewhat more likely to say that fraud is very common. On beliefs about voter impersonation, race pulls somewhat in the opposite direction. Only 8 12 percent of Whites think voter impersonation occurs very often, compared with 18 percent of Blacks and Hispanics. These small racial differences become statistically insignificant upon controlling for other factors, especially party and ideology (see Table 4 below). The exception arises with Voter Impersonation. In that analysis, Whites where significantly less likely than other racial groups to believe that impersonation occurs often or very often, even after controlling for income, age, ideology, education, region, and political attitudes. On voter fraud and theft, however, the difference across racial groups becomes insignificant when controlling for party and ideology.
Education and age also proved important in explaining beliefs about different sorts of vote fraud. Both correlated negatively. Better educated people think fraud is much less common than less well educated people. Of those with a college degree or higher, 8 percent said that voter impersonation occurs very often and 19 percent said it is very rare. By comparison, 15 percent of those without a high school degree think impersonation occurs very often and only 8 percent think it is very rare. Using the 2007 survey question wording, we see a similar pattern. Of those with a college degree, 19 percent say voter fraud is very common and 13 percent say it almost never occurs. Of those without a high school degree, 29 percent say fraud is very common and only 5 percent think it almost never occurs.
Age also correlates significantly with beliefs about voting fraud. Of those born before 1945, 30 percent think impersonation is rare or very rare and 47 percent think it occurs often or very often. By contrast, 43 percent those born after 1961 think impersonation is rare or very rare and 40 percent think it occurs often or very often. In regression analyses (see Table 4 ), Education and Age proved the only regularly important demographic predictors of beliefs.
Partisan and demographic differences, however, distract from a more important commonality running through the data. Those who believe that one form of vote fraud occurs frequently are very likely to believe that the other form occurs frequently. As Table 2 describes, belief in fraud is strongly, positively correlated with belief in theft (r=.51) and in voter impersonation (r = .75). Of those who think voter fraud is very common, for example, 59 percent think vote theft is very common and 47% think voter impersonation occurs very often. Partisan differences at least among the public as a whole are of secondary importance. The central conjecture in the Purcell dictum and the Crawford briefs holds that the perception of fraud is extensive, weakens public confidence in the electoral process, and, thereby, lowers participation. Requiring voters to 14 show photo identification, it is asserted, will appear to stem illegal voting, thereby, restoring the confidence of legal voters in the process.
These arguments point to a specific empirical prediction. Perceptions of higher rates of voter fraud ought to correlate negatively with participation in the electoral process. This is a novel conjecture within the academic research on voter turnout and has not been subject to empirical study. Past research has found correlations between an individual's sense of political efficacy and his or her reported vote and intentions to vote.
27 Also, researchers have examined the connection between electoral laws, such as the Voting Rights Act or Election Day Registration provisions, and turnout.
28 But we know of no research that examines the connection between beliefs about fraud and the likelihood of voting.
We can test this conjecture directly using the data available through the MIT Reported Vote reflects the respondents' own reports as to whether they voted in the 2006 general election. Reported vote is the most commonly studied indicator of political participation, even though it is well known to exaggerate actual levels of participation owing to measurement error and misreporting. In the 2004 American National Election Study, 80 percent reported voting in the general election. 29 This has been determined to be a mix of incorrect reporting and sample selection. Because surveys of voter turnout tend to misrepresent the voting population, achieving a more accurate measure of turnout requires the more labor intensive endeavor of independently verifying which survey respondents, in fact, turned out to vote. Validated Vote indicates all survey respondents who actually voted according to official election records, regardless of how they responded to the questions. Polimetrix, the firm that conducted the survey, attempted to match the 2007 survey respondents to the voter registration rolls. This allows us to validate the reported vote using the individual's actual vote history. Validated vote, then, consists of all people who reported that they voted and whose names could be matched to a record on the voter rolls. Non-voters among the validated are those whose names appear on the registration rolls and who did not vote and those who indicated in the survey that they were not registered to vote. Some respondents say they are registered but no record is found. We omit these ambiguous cases. The validated vote rate of those matched to the rolls or identified as not registered equaled 57 percent, still an overestimate as compared to actual returns but much closer to the actual share of the population who turned out to vote.
Intent to Vote in the 2008 Presidential Primary provides a third indicator of participation. The survey asked voters in November of 2007 whether they intended to vote in the coming 2008 Presidential Primary elections and, if so, which party and for which candidate. Like reported vote, vote intentions tend to exaggerate actual behavior. In the 2007 sample, 75 percent said they intend to vote in the primary. We view this not as a measure of behavior so much as a measure of psychological attachment to the process and interest in electoral politics. In the 2008 survey, an even greater percentage (78 percent) expressed their intention to vote in the 2008 general election.
We examine how each of these measures of electoral participation (reported, validated, and intention) vary with perceptions of the frequency of voter fraud, voter impersonation and vote theft. Table 3 Purcell theory of citizen engagement were true, voter participation should be lower among those who think fraud or impersonation occurs very often.
No such correlation emerges, and if anything the data suggest the opposite occurs. Those who are not sure how much fraud occurs in the electoral process exhibit the lowest participation rates across all measures. Among those who had some belief about the extent of fraud or impersonation the correlation between that belief and turnout proved extremely weak and always statistically insignificant. Inspection of each of the columns in the table shows that reported, validated, and intent to vote are nearly invariant to beliefs about vote fraud, vote theft, and voter impersonation.
Even apart from these empirical problems, it is not obvious as a theoretical matter why a voter who perceives a lot of fraud would not vote. If the advocates of this hypothesis adhere to some rational actor model, then the potential effect of a vote even under conditions of great fraud will still give the voter at least some chance to influence the outcome of an election. Staying home ensures that the voter has no effect. Of course, strictly speaking, the rational actor model cannot explain why people vote at all, given the low likelihood that a voter will cast the tie-breaking vote in an election.
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However, assuming people vote because of some instrumental benefit, impersonation fraud will not reduce that benefit to zero (therefore equal to not voting) unless the voter knows that so much fraud will take place that his vote is certain not to make a difference. It seems more plausible that the rationale for refusing to vote under conditions of voter fraud reflects some kind of disgust for a corrupt system. In other words, voters will disengage not because there is no point in voting, but rather because the electoral system is perceived to be so corrupt that some voters simply do not want to be a part of it. Whatever the mechanics that underlay this hypothesis, the data reject that as an accurate description of present-day America. OF DEMOCRACY 274 (1957) . Downs formalized an old puzzle. Learned Hand formulated the problem in his essay "Democracy, Its Presumptions and Realities" (1932) : "My vote is one of the most unimportant acts of my life; if I were to acquaint myself with the matters on which it ought really to depend, if I were to try to get a judgment on which I was willing to risk affairs of even the smallest moment, I should be doing nothing else, and that seems a fatuous conclusion to a fatuous undertaking." Reprinted in LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 93 (1974 Not only does Purcell posit that fears of voter fraud will lower citizen engagement, but the Court appears to assume that voter identification laws, at least to some degree, will lessen those fears and bolster voter confidence in elections. Even if such fears do not affect the likelihood of voting, if the remedy bolsters confidence one might still say the policy is worth pursuing. However, the data that exist on the relationship between voter ID laws and fears of fraud do not support even this more modest argument.
_______________________________________________________________
We test this argument in three ways. First, we can measure the effect of statewide frequency of the use of identification when voting on individual participation rates. Second, we can examine whether those who were asked to show photo identification in 2006 in fact had more confidence in the process in 2007. Third, we can examine whether residents in states with stricter identification requirements for voting, in fact, tend to think fraud happens less frequently.
The particular structure of the Cooperative Congressional Election study allows us to measure the use of voter identification at the aggregate statelevel and the individual level. The 2006 CCES asked individuals whether they were asked to show picture identification when they voted. 33 Approximately half of all voters say that they were asked to show photo identification, with the highest rates in the Southern states and the lowest rates in the New England region. 34 States served as the sampling frame for the 2006 CCES, and the very large 36,500 person sample creates sufficient density of cases in each state that we can aggregate the individual level responses to the state level to estimate 33 The 2006 CCES surveyed respondents before the general election and within a week after the election. The post-election battery asked:
Were you asked to show picture identification, such as a driver's license, at the polling place this November? Yes/No. If Yes, were you then allowed to vote? Yes/No. the frequency with which voter identification is required in the states. Of course, only a few states actually mandate photo identification as the only acceptable form of identification in order to vote. 35 We suspect that most respondents who say they were asked for photo ID, in fact, were merely asked for some form of ID and they produced a photo ID, which is the most likely type of identification voters would have handy. Nevertheless, one might suspect that if more stringent identification requirements produce more confidence in elections that voters who say they needed to produce ID would have lower fears of fraud than those not similarly asked. 36 Moreover, although the aggregated responses do not reveal (and differ from) what the law on the books actually requires in many states, one still might expect that respondents from states where larger shares of people say they were required to produce a photo ID might have different views on the prevalence of fraud.
The data demonstrate no relationship between either individual level or aggregate rates of voter identification and perception of fraud and impersonation. The correlations between Beliefs about Voter Fraud and Vote Theft and the incidence of voter identification are very small and statistically indistinguishable from zero in both samples. We measure the incidence of voter identification two ways. A survey respondent may have been asked in 2006 to show photo identification when voting, or he or she may have lived in a state with a relatively high incidence of the use of voter identification when voting. In the 2007 survey, the correlations between an individual showing identification in 2006 and beliefs in voter fraud and voter theft were .05 and .03, respectively. The correlation between the percent of people in a state asked to show voter identification and beliefs in voter fraud and vote theft were .00 and .04, respectively, in the 2007 survey. The correlations between the percent of people in a state asked to show voter identification and beliefs in voter fraud and vote impersonation were -.03 and -.03, respectively, in the 35 See Electionline, Voter ID Laws, available at http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid=364http://electionline.org/Default.aspx?tabid =364 36 Of course, it is also possible that photo ID is required in areas where a greater fear of fraud precipitated the passage of a photo ID law. If so, then we might expect ID requirements to have the reverse effect and be a symptom of voters' fears of fraud, rather than a remedy. The same might be true if photo ID laws lead people to worry that more fraud is being policed. Just as when a large police presence in a neighborhood might heighten residents' fears of crime, so too stringent voter ID laws might cause them to worry that fraud has made such requirements necessary. Even if one of these theories is true, it still represents counterevidence to the notion that voter ID laws will lead to the mitigation of fears of election fraud. It is also possible that respondents may answer the vote fraud question with respect to the nation as a whole, while not believing that fraud occurs in their state in particular.
20
2008 survey. As the regression presented in Table 4 explains, holding constant education, party identification, ideology, race, age, and other predictors did not improve matters. In none of the regressions do the measures of the incidence of the use of voter identification exhibit any significant relationship to any of the measures of beliefs about voter fraud. The strongest association arises with Impersonation, and the coefficient has the wrong sign (meaning that those subjected to photo ID requirements believe, if anything, that fraud is more prevalent). Whether the state or local election administration frequently ask for voter identification or not seems to have no relationship to individuals' beliefs about the frequency of fraud or voter impersonation. _______________________________________________________________ Table 4 The story is the same if we look at the correlation (or lack thereof) between the stringency of a state's voter identification requirements and its residents' perceived frequency of fraud. First, we should note that there is (as we hoped and expected) a strong correlation (+.78) between the stringency of a 21 state's identification requirements and the share of the state's population in the CCES that reports being asked for photo identification. In order to characterize the stringency of a state's identification requirement we adopt the categories supplied by Alvarez, Bailey and Katz, 37 who array states into categories depending on what identification the state requires from voters at the polls. 38 The categorization of states, along with their associated rate of response to the CCES photo ID question is presented in Appendix C.
We find no relationship between the stringency of a state's photo identification requirement in 2006 and the share of its population reporting that fraud occurs frequently. The sample sizes for our fraud and impersonation questions in the 2007 and 2008 surveys are too small to get accurate statespecific samples of perceptions of fraud. Nevertheless, what we do have shows that states that request or require photo identification do not have markedly different rates of perception of fraud or impersonation than those that merely require a signature from the voter, for example. In the average state in 2008, 13 percent of the respondents believe fraud is very common 39 , and 9 percent believe impersonation occurs very often. However, in the 4 states with the strictest identification requirements, the beliefs in fraud are nearly identical to the national average: 13 percent think fraud is very common and 9 percent think impersonation occurs very often. By contrast, in the 7 states with the least restrictive identification requirements, 40 11 percent say fraud is very 22 common and 8 percent say impersonation occurs very often. In short, states differ in the share of the population who thinks that fraud occurs frequently, but the stringency of their identification requirements is not responsible for those differences.
VI. Conclusions
There is always a risk when judges base their decisions on untested empirical claims about political behavior that a more serious inquiry into the data will prove them wrong. This risk is particularly great when judges attempt to assess American public opinion and its likely consequences. 41 We think the Court made this mistake in Purcell and threatens to do so again in Crawford. We worry, in particular, that the arena of vote fraud and voter ID is ripe for such conjectures about perceptions because, as with campaign finance, the more relevant empirical claims about the existence of fraud and the potential for disfranchisement are so contested. Our exploration of the data presented here, however, suggests that casual assertions about popular beliefs should not substitute for the difficult balancing of the constitutional risks and probabilities of vote fraud and vote denial.
Although a sizable share of the population believes that vote fraud commonly or occasionally occurs, there is little or no relationship between beliefs about the frequency of fraud and electoral participation (reported, validated, or intended) . To the extent that any correlation holds it runs counter to expectations. Nor does it appear to be the case that universal voter identification requirements will raise levels of trust in the electoral process. Such fears appear unaffected by stricter voter ID laws, given that individuals asked to produce ID seem to have the same beliefs about the frequency of fraud as those not asked for ID.
We would not fault the Court for its very plausible, even if currently false, intuition. It makes sense to assume that as perceived fraud increases, the share of honest citizens willing to participate in the fraudulent system would decline. Election boycotts in the face of fears of election rigging are commonplace in the developing world.
We are also quite sympathetic to the broad principle that states should act to bolster confidence in elections and their administration. That confidence may be difficult to restore in the post-Bush v. Gore 42 era, when any irregularity -real or hypothesized-is perceived as having the potential to decide the fate 41 See generally Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (N. Persily et al eds., 2008) (discussing the use of public opinion in constitutional cases). 42 531 U. S. 98 (2000) . even of a national election. 43 Nevertheless, states would do well to address real problems with real metrics for success, while weighing favorable effects on public opinion as a considerable side benefit. 44 This article has attempted to do just that in the case of photo identification requirements. Their use seems to bear little correlation to public beliefs about the incidence of fraud. The possible relation of such beliefs to participation appears even more tenuous. The lack of an empirical association between beliefs about fraud and participation and between the use of photo identification and beliefs about 43 The Income  1  st Quintile  11%  41%  22%  15%  12%  10%  31%  24%  14%  21%  2  nd Quintile  12%  31%  26%  16%  13%  8%  30%  27%  14%  21%  3  rd Quintile  14%  28%  27%  17%  14%  8%  30%  30%  17%  15%  4  th Quintile  16%  39%  25%  8%  9%  11%  36%  34%  8%  11%  5  th Quintile  14%  36%  23%  17%  9%  10%  35%  28%  15%  11% 
